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Howard Darmstadter1*
Abstract: I argue for a type of relativism that allows different people to have 
conflicting accurate representations of the world. This is contrary to the view of 
most Anglo-American philosophers, who would, with Paul Boghossian in Fear of 
Knowledge, deny that “there are many radically different, yet ‘equally valid’ ways of 
knowing the world.” My argument is not a metaphysical argument about the ulti-
mate nature of the outside world, but a psychological argument about the mental 
processes of representation. The argument starts from a few principles of naïve (or 
folk) psychology, but is later extended to apply to mechanisms that do not have a 
“psychology.” Finally, I briefly discuss the anti-relativist impulse in philosophy, with 
particular reference to Boghossian’s example of non-scientific beliefs regarding 
Lakota origins. I argue that both we and the Lakotas have good reason to reject 
such beliefs while still remaining relativists. Being a relativist does not mean that 
you get to believe whatever you like.
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1. Fact objectivism and fact relativism
Most of us believe the standard archeological account that “humans first entered the Americas from 
Asia, crossing the Bering Strait some 10,000 years ago” (Boghossian, 2006, p. 1; recent research sug-
gests that humans may have been in the Americas as early as 15,500  years ago (Waters et al., 
2011)). An alternative account has been offered by Sebastian LeBeau, an official of the Cheyenne 
River Sioux, a Lakota tribe based in Eagle Butte, South Dakota, that
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We know where we came from. We are the descendants of the Buffalo people. They came 
from inside the earth after supernatural spirits prepared this world for humankind to live 
here. If non-Indians choose to believe they evolved from an ape, so be it. I have yet to come 
across five Lakotas who believe in science and in evolution. (Boghossian, 2006, p. 1, quoting 
The New York Times, 22 October 1996, p. 1)
For me, and I imagine for most of you, this sounds quite daft. Nonetheless, the LeBeau account is 
said to draw support from some social scientists and philosophers who argue that knowledge is 
“socially constructed.” It’s not that they share Mr. LeBeau’s beliefs, just that they admit that, as Paul 
Boghossian describes it, “there are many radically different, yet ‘equally valid’ ways of knowing the 
world, with science being just one of them.”(Ibid, p. 2) So, one view for us scientifically minded types 
and another equally valid view for Mr. LeBeau and the Lakotas. Live and let live.
Boghossian will have none of it. In Fear of Knowledge: Against Relativism and Constructivism, he 
attacks social constructivism, devoting the first three chapters to what he calls “fact constructiv-
ism”—the denial that there is any “objective fact of the matter” (Ibid, pp. 3, 25)—and the remainder 
to what he considers a less extreme view, “epistemic” relativism.
I agree with Boghossian’s assessment of the LeBeau view, and I share his suspicion of the more 
radical forms of social constructivism. But I think Boghossian’s proposed solution misguided. Far 
from being an inconsistent view, I believe that something like fact constructivism may be the near 
inescapable consequence of some of our fundamental beliefs. I shall propose a non-technical argu-
ment for a type of relativism that resembles fact constructivism in holding that different people can 
have conflicting accurate representations of the world. The argument will proceed in easy steps 
from premises that most readers should find uncontroversial.
For a fact objectivist like Boghossian, things are simple: There is a fact-of-the-matter “out there” 
to which the scientific account of Lakota origins probably does, and the LeBeau account almost 
certainly does not, conform.
Things are more complicated for a relativist: Yes, there is a fact-of-the-matter, but both the scien-
tific and the LeBeau views can “represent” it, though in different ways. The relativist is not denying 
the existence of an external reality, but making a point about the psychology of mental representa-
tion. This cryptic description will become clearer as my argument progresses. (In the following, I 
shall generally use “relativism” as a shorthand for the kind of relativism I propose here, and “real-
ism” for what Boghossian might call “fact objectivism.”)
The difficulty for the realist is explaining how only a single set of beliefs can “conform” to reality; 
the difficulty for the relativist is explaining how he can justify accepting one set of representations 
while rejecting another. For example, I shall eventually have to square my defense of relativism with 
my favoring a more standard archeological account of Lakota origins. But first I shall set out my 
argument for relativism. I’ll return to Mr. LeBeau and the Lakotas at the end, and realists may then 
take what joy they can from my Houdini-like performance.
Before plunging into my argument, I should say something about the stakes involved. Boghossian 
notes three aspects that are essential to belief: “Any belief must have a propositional content; any 
belief can be assessed as true or false; and any belief can be assessed as justified or unjustified, ra-
tional or irrational” (Boghossian, 2006, pp. 10–11, emphasis in original). A relativist would deny the 
last two, at least in the sense Boghossian intends. But much of current epistemology involves an 
attempt to construct standards of justification, and that construction relies for the most part on a 
non-constructivist view of truth. If the relativist is right, then much of this epistemological project is 
wrongheaded. Boghossian says that “there is one humanities discipline in which [the hold of con-
structivist ideas] is actually quite weak, and that is in philosophy itself, at least as it its practiced 
within the mainstream of analytic philosophy departments within the English-speaking world.” (Ibid, 
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p. 7) So relativism isn’t just one philosophical position among many, but an attack on much of phi-
losophy as currently practiced. Sorry about that.
2. Starting from folk psychology
My argument starts with a few premises of naive (or folk) psychology:
We have beliefs and desires.
We take actions based on our beliefs in order to achieve our desires.
We do not all have the same beliefs and desires.
Unsophisticated perhaps (or not—see Pinker, 1997, pp. 60–64), but it’s the model we use most of 
the time. Once I have developed my argument, I’ll try to extend it so that it relies less on these folk-
psychological premises.
3. Inconsistent models
The next building block of the argument will be less familiar:
We use “models”—that is, simplified belief systems—to achieve specific desires in specific 
situations. These models are often inconsistent with the models we use in other situations or 
to achieve other desires.
As an example, suppose Archie’s car won’t start. In explaining why the car won’t start, Archie may 
use a model that contains his belief that a car with a dead battery won’t start. Once convinced that 
the battery is indeed dead, he may shift to a model containing his belief that a car with a dead bat-
tery will start if you give it a push. But note that the second belief—that a car with a dead battery will 
start if you give it a push—is logically inconsistent with the first belief, that a car with a dead battery 
won’t start. (Formal logic requires that for a contradiction, we must also assume that some cars with 
dead batteries have been pushed, which should present no difficulties.) Each of these beliefs is part 
of a (different) simplified model, or schematic, of our complex world. Each model is useful only in 
certain situations to achieve certain desires. Each model is likely to be internally consistent, but in-
consistent with other models used in other situations or to achieve other desires. In the example just 
given, the model Archie used to explain why his car wouldn’t start was different from, and inconsist-
ent with, the model Archie used to get the car started. As we navigate our days, we continually shift 
from model to model to deal with the contingencies of daily life.
It might be objected that the beliefs that Archie seems to deploy in daily life are not his real beliefs. 
That is, while it might seem that Archie in one situation believes that a car will not start with a dead 
battery, and in a different situation holds the inconsistent belief that a car with a dead battery will 
start if given a push, what Archie actually believes in both situations is that all other things being 
equal, you can’t start a car with a dead battery, and that all other things being equal, a car with a 
dead battery can be started by giving it a push.
Such a proposal saves consistency only in the most evanescent sense. On my account, Archie, in 
certain situations uses a model with the belief that you can’t start a car with a dead battery. On the 
alternative proposal, in those same situations Archie first judges that all other things are equal so 
that he can use a model with the quasi-belief that you can’t start a car with a dead battery. He then 
switches situations, again judges that all other things are equal for the new situation, and switches 
to the quasi-belief that you can start a car with a dead battery by giving it a push. But on the alterna-
tive proposal, it is the quasi-beliefs that do all the work because it is the quasi-beliefs, unlike the 
all-other-things-being-equal beliefs, that have the interesting logical consequences. The alternative 
proposal saves consistency by making our “real” beliefs largely irrelevant to our lives. (I develop a 
fuller argument for this premise in Darmstadter (1971)).
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4. Representational accuracy: Models and maps
The next premises in my argument may surprise:
Our models (that is, our simplified belief systems) are representations that can be more or 
less accurate.
One thing accurately represents another thing when there is an isomorphism between the 
two things; the more “complete” the isomorphism, the more accurate the representation.
“Surprise” because these premises seem to be a statement of realism. But as I argue below, the 
premises are compatible with my kind of relativism.
An isomorphism obtains when various points and relations of one thing correspond to various 
points and relations of another thing. The relation of a road map to the road system mapped pro-
vides a nice illustration. Suppose Archie, who wants to drive to Onionville, consults a road map. The 
map is useful because Archie has certain beliefs about the relationship of road maps to roads. In 
particular, Archie believes that dots on the map labeled with the names of cities and towns corre-
spond to actual cities and towns with those names, that lines on the map correspond to roads, and 
that distances on the map are scaled to highway distances. The map enables Archie to form new 
beliefs (“I-84 will take me almost all the way to Onionville”) so that he can act to achieve his desires. 
But Archie’s model of the terrain derived from the map is vastly simpler than the world, since the 
map itself is vastly simpler than the world. The map doesn’t show traffic conditions, stop signs, toll 
booths, potholes, dead zones for cell phones, and many other features that Archie might want to 
know about in planning his trip. On the other hand, Archie can fold the map up and slip it into his 
pocket, something he can’t do with 2,500 square miles of actual countryside.
If Archie’s situation were different, he might be better served by a different map/model. For exam-
ple, if Archie was traveling by bicycle rather than car, then his model will likely not contain the belief 
that I–84 will get him to Onionville—Sorry, no bicycles on the Interstate—which is inconsistent with 
Archie’s beliefs in his let’s-go-by-car model.
Of course, maps can be inaccurate. If Archie’s road map is not isomorphic to the real world be-
cause the dot on the map labeled “Onionville” is in fact Petuniaville, then Archie’s attempts to get to 
Onionville, whether by car or bicycle, are likely to fail.
Because I may have different desires and be in a different situation than you, the belief 
models that help me attain my desires may be inconsistent with the belief models that help 
you attain your desires.
This isn’t a premise, but a straightforward consequence of what’s gone before: If Archie uses mod-
els that contain beliefs that are inconsistent as between models, then some beliefs in Archie’s mod-
els are likely to be inconsistent with some beliefs in Betty’s models. Consider our road map example: 
If Archie is going to Onionville by car, while Betty is going by bicycle, then Betty’s let’s-go-to-Onion-
ville model may well contain beliefs that are inconsistent with the beliefs in Archie’s let’s-go-to-On-
ionville model.
(A similar argument—that different situations call for different models—is made by Paul Krugman 
regarding conflicting economic models:
[The Samuelsonian] approach … combines the grand tradition of microeconomics, with its 
emphasis on how the invisible hand leads to generally desirable outcomes, with Keynesian 
macroeconomics, which emphasizes the way the economy can develop magneto trouble 
requiring policy intervention.
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It’s a deeply reasonable approach—but it’s also intellectually unstable. For it requires some 
strategic inconsistency in how you think about the economy. When you’re doing micro, you 
assume rational individuals and rapidly clearing markets; when you’re doing macro, frictions 
and ad hoc behavioral assumptions are essential.
So what? Inconsistency in the pursuit of useful guidance is no vice. The map is not the 
territory, and it’s OK to use different kinds of maps depending on what you’re trying to 
accomplish: if you’re driving, a road map suffices, if you’re going hiking, you really need a 
topo. (Krugman, 2010)
Always nice to have a Nobel laureate in your corner).
5. There is no universal model
This is not (yet) a complete argument for relativism. For it may be that beyond the jangling fragmen-
tary models we use there stands a single all-inclusive non-contradictory model—the true belief sys-
tem—that would help us achieve any desire in any situation. Motorists and cyclists could then wend 
their separate ways to Onionville with a single map package that works for each of them.
The argument between realists and relativists thus comes down to this: Is there a single com-
pletely accurate—i.e. isomorphic—belief system. While such a system may be too much for any 
person, perhaps the entire human community, aided by libraries, data banks, and other repositories 
of information, could collectively possess such a system.
The problem, however, is not that we can’t have an accurate belief system, but that unless we 
restrict the sorts of relationships we allow among elements in the world almost any belief system 
can be shown to accurately represent the world. Put another way, the correspondence theory of 
truth cannot work: If we are allowed to limit in advance the relationships that can obtain among ele-
ments of the external world, then correspondence/isomorphism cannot be an independent test of 
truth. But without such prior limitations, the world will be underdetermined by accurate representa-
tions. A somewhat technical proof appears in Darmstadter (1974) as part of a general attack on the 
correspondence theory of truth.1 (For those who might still think that we can possess a single all-
encompassing model, Section 8 contains an independent argument against that view).
6. Do I contradict myself?
This may be an appropriate point to consider two criticisms that are commonly made when relativ-
istic theses are proposed. First: If, as I claim, most of our thinking involves the use of simplified 
models of the world, what can we say about the argument I am putting forward here? Isn’t it just 
another simplified model?
Of course!—except for that “just.” The model of belief proposed here leads to relativistic conclu-
sions. There will, of course, be other models that lead to non-relativistic conclusions. Thus, my argu-
ment cannot settle the issue. But I hope that my argument will be persuasive because it rests on 
premises that many will find congenial—indeed, inescapable—and has consequences that are con-
sistent with our experience. Relativism, I will contend, is a very useful model.
7. Philosophy in the psychological mode
Second: To talk about models and their representational accuracy, we have to talk about the rela-
tionship of beliefs and other mental elements to the world. But how can we talk about the relation-
ship of our inner mental world with the outside world? Isn’t that to assume a God-like overview? For 
example, at some points in the argument, I confidently talk about beliefs accurately representing an 
external world, but at others (as in my proof, referenced above, that the correspondence theory can-
not work) suggest that we should not assume anything about that world, as when we limit the kinds 
of relationships permitted for an isomorphism.
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If I were to remark that I believe it to be raining outside, my remark would normally be taken by 
listeners in the everyday mode, as an alert to the possibility that stepping out may get you wet. In 
this everyday mode, listeners may wonder if I have misread the signs—those puddles may be lefto-
vers from last night’s rain or this morning’s street cleaning—but not whether I am deluded about the 
existence of the outside world. The everyday mode of speaking and thinking assumes a good deal 
about our everyday world.
Alternatively, listeners may view my remark in a psychological mode, and wonder about the men-
tal processes that culminated in my belief. In the psychological mode, we again assume a great deal 
about our everyday world, but take a more sophisticated view of mental processes.
Finally, there is a metaphysical mode in which the listener may wonder if the rain or I really exist, 
or if we exist, what relation we might have to the listener’s thoughts. In the metaphysical mode, we 
cannot simply assume that there is an everyday world.
I intend for readers to understand my argument in the psychological mode. I have characterized 
the third mode as “metaphysical” rather than “philosophical” because I believe the psychological 
mode is an honorable mode in the history of philosophy—the mode of the British empiricists and 
American pragmatists.
In speaking of metaphysical and psychological modes I am obviously oversimplifying. There are 
no doubt numerous other modes or submodes. My concern here is not to present a taxonomy, but 
merely to allow for multiple modes of discourse and to give a rough survey of the ground upon which 
I propose to pitch my tent.
“Mode” has the same root as “model,” and speaking of metaphysical and psychological modes 
comports nicely with my view that we use inconsistent models in our dealings with the world. 
Philosophers of a metaphysical bent have different interests than philosophers of a psychological 
bent.
It’s not always clear whether a statement is intended in the psychological or the metaphysical 
mode. Consider this passage from Nelson Goodman:
Now as we thus make constellations by picking out and putting together certain stars rather 
than others, so we make stars by drawing certain boundaries rather than others. Nothing 
dictates whether the skies shall be marked off into constellations or other objects. We have 
to make what we find, be it the Great Dipper, Sirius, food, fuel, or a stereo system. (Goodman, 
1996, p. 156; as quoted in Boghossian, 2006, p. 33)
I take Goodman to be speaking in the psychological mode: Just as we group certain stars together 
as the Big Dipper because, seen from our solar system, they appear to have a particular form, so all 
the objects of our world are simply our assemblages based on how things appear from our particular 
vantage point.
Boghossian, however, appears to take Goodman’s statements in the metaphysical mode:
If our concepts are cutting lines into some basic worldly dough and thus imbuing it with 
a structure it would not otherwise possess, doesn’t there have to be some worldly dough 
for them to get to work on, and mustn’t the basic properties of that dough be determined 
independently of all this fact-constituting activity? This basic dough can be quite spare. 
Perhaps it is just the space-time manifold, or a distribution of energy, or whatever. Still, must 
there not some such basic stuff for this picture even to make sense? And if there is, doesn’t 
that put paid to a generalized description-dependence of facts? (Boghossian, 2006, p. 35)
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According to Boghossian, if we’re interacting with some stuff “out there” that exists independent 
of what we believe about it, then there must be some “facts” about that stuff independent of our 
beliefs, and the existence of these facts must be incompatible with relativism.
Distinguishing between different modes of discourse may explain what some readers may find 
puzzling, namely my failure to directly confront any of Boghossian’s arguments. Operating in the 
psychological mode, my fundamental building blocks are “beliefs” and “representations” rather 
than Boghossian’s metaphysical tool-kit of “truth,” “knowledge,” and “facts.” Similarly, for most 
other contemporary philosophical writings on relativism, which likewise speak in the metaphysical 
mode, and which I likewise do not confront (e.g. Rovane, 2013; or the papers collected in Krausz, 
2010).
In employing different modes of discourse, Boghossian and I are no doubt talking past each other. 
But note that if we were to take Boghossian’s argument in the psychological mode, it would fall 
apart. In the psychological mode, we can admit—indeed, insist—that there is some basic “dough,” 
namely the elementary particles of physics. Or, rather, we can insist on integrating the models of 
physics into our models of thinking. Taken in the psychological mode, the view that there is a “dough” 
out there composed of quarks or super strings or whatever, far from being inconsistent with relativ-
ism, will form part of my argument for it (see Section 8). (As it happens, two physicists have ad-
vanced a position—“model-dependent realism”—somewhat similar to the kind of relativism I argue 
for (Hawking & Mlodinow, 2010)).
Speaking and thinking in the psychological mode, we can imagine Mindy, a twenty-second-centu-
ry psychologist who is investigating the fine structure of Archie’s and Betty’s brains and mapping 
their beliefs onto the external world. In doing so, Mindy will assume a certain structure for that 
world, namely the structure of her own belief system. Thus, for Mindy, many potential relations 
among elements of the world, and thus many potential isomorphisms, will not be permitted. Mindy 
can therefore conclude that Archie’s beliefs are accurate representations of the world while Betty’s 
are not. If other psychologists accept Mindy’s structure for the world, there may be widespread 
agreement about which representations are accurate. In this sort of situation, realism becomes an 
attractive proposition. But the distinction between accurate and inaccurate representations de-
pends critically on agreement among the psychological community about the relevant beliefs; Mork, 
a visiting psychologist from the planet Ork who has quite different beliefs about the world, might 
permit isomorphisms that Mindy would not allow, and thus see Betty’s beliefs as accurate and 
Archie’s as inaccurate.
8. One isomorphism to rule them all?
It might seem that since in the psychological mode we are allowed to start with a relatively full-
blown set of beliefs about the world, then there might be a unique isomorphism that is consistent 
with some “core” set of generally agreed beliefs. For example, we might assume that theories and 
facts in physics, while perhaps not the ultimate Truth About Things, are at least the best currently 
available model of the world. Still, it seems unlikely that even limiting our isomorphisms in this way 
will give us a unique isomorphism.
Physics tells us that the world is made up of many small things, and that these things have proper-
ties and interact in ways that are consequential for the larger world. Indeed, if these micro goings-on 
did not have macro effects, we would never have discovered them. The upshot is that there is no way 
a belief system that does not track everything in the world will allow us to make totally accurate 
predictions. Therefore, the best course for each of us is to have a belief system that allows us to 
make the best possible predictions for our particular desires and situations. Since our desires and 
situations differ, it seems likely that our belief systems should differ as well. It thus seems unlikely 
that even agreement about core scientific beliefs can provide a unique isomorphism with respect to 
beliefs about other areas—medicine, politics, philosophy, art, religion. When it comes to achieving 
our different desires, there is no best-for-everybody belief system.
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There was a time when philosophers imagined that all our beliefs might be reduced to beliefs 
about fundamental particles, but few today believe such a reductionist program can be made to 
work. The depressing fact is that the amount of stuff in the world that must be mapped is vastly 
greater than the elements of even the composite belief system of many believers.
9. Relativism without psychology
Some readers may have realized that my argument can be broadened; in particular, it doesn’t de-
pend on the premise I borrowed from folk psychology, namely that people have beliefs and desires. 
That was convenient to develop the argument, but I now hope it can be seen that the argument 
applies to any system that tries to achieve various states by relying on internalized representations 
(models, pictures, maps, or schemata) that are isomorphic to the objects represented (modeled, 
pictured, mapped, or schematized).
Imagine that during the dark days of the cold war, America and Russia each develop chess-play-
ing computers (CPCs). Each country’s CPC is designed to defeat the human chess players of the other 
country, thus demonstrating the technological prowess of the country fielding the winning CPC. Each 
country quickly discovers that brute force methods—tracking the possible consequences of each 
move and position—do not work because of limitations of computer memory and processing power. 
(These limitations may now have been overcome (Kasparov, 2010)). Accordingly, incomplete infor-
mation about the consequences of various moves is supplemented by tactical and strategic maxims 
that operate as accurate, though not infallible, predictors of situations many moves in advance.
As it happens, American and Russian human chess players have different “styles.” That is, in simi-
lar situations, Americans and Russians make different moves based on different strategic principles. 
The CPCs are programmed with strategies to counter these styles of play. In the event, each coun-
try’s CPC proves highly successful in defeating the other country’s individual players, but less suc-
cessful against players from its own country. The programmed strategies of the Russian CPC that 
work against the American players don’t work as well against Russian players, and vice versa.
Each CPC has been designed to achieve a certain result—checkmate—that it occasionally fails to 
reach because of the mechanism’s internal limitations. Accordingly, the program is not fully ade-
quate: The CPC is more effective against some types of players than others.
A CPC may be said to have desires—the desires of its designers—and beliefs—the programmed 
strategic principles for the CPC—but such references to desires and beliefs are merely analogical. But 
insofar as we want to liken the internal states of the CPC to beliefs, then we can say that the conflict-
ing beliefs of the Russian and American CPCs may be equally accurate.
The upshot is that while my argument depends on its folk-psychological initial premises, those 
premises may be seen as a way of stating more general principles that hold even for entities that do 
not have a “psychology.”
10. The anti-relativist impulse
Where does all this leave us? With a multitude of representations, some better suited (because more 
accurate and more relevant), or worse suited (because less accurate or less relevant) to our particu-
lar situations and desires. The argument preserves a part of realism—the distinction between ac-
curate and inaccurate representations—and suggests that it is the accurate representations that 
are most useful. But it diverges from realism in allowing a multitude of divergent accurate represen-
tations.2 I’ve argued elsewhere that this result doesn’t have the baleful effects usually credited to 
relativism (Darmstadter, 2007), but here I merely want to comment on the anti-relativist impulse in 
philosophy.
Epistemologists have often seen their discipline as questing after standards of truth, or right rea-
son, or warranted assertability, or whatever, that will enable us to separate good theories from bad. 
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We imagine that we can acquire the tools to deliver crushing ripostes to all sorts of deviant thinkers 
and intellectual fraudsters; faced with epistemological criticism, they will stand dumbfounded, em-
barrassed by their own inadequacy. Having arrived at such standards, epistemology can pack its 
bags and go home, mission accomplished.
Years ago, as an undergraduate, I realized that this quest was quixotic. The spur to this realization 
was reading the conclusion to Quine’s “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”:
The totality of our so-called knowledge or beliefs, from the most casual matters of 
geography and history to the profoundest laws of atomic physics or even of pure 
mathematics and logic, is a man-made fabric which impinges on experience only along the 
edges. … A conflict with experience at the periphery occasions readjustments in the interior 
of the field. Truth values have to be redistributed over some of our statements. … But the 
total field is so undetermined by its boundary conditions, experience, that there is much 
latitude of choice as to what statements to re-evaluate in the light of any single contrary 
experience. No particular experiences are linked with any particular statements in the 
interior of the field, except indirectly through considerations of equilibrium affecting the field 
as a whole. … Any statement can be held true come what may, if we make drastic enough 
adjustments elsewhere in the system. … Conversely, by the same token, no statement is 
immune to revision. (Quine, 1961, p. 46)
So if I feel that intelligent design theory is hogwash or our drug laws barbaric, there is no argu-
ment I can deploy or evidence I can muster that will convince everyone. Indeed, I don’t believe there 
is any argument or evidence that is likely to quickly convince very many people who believe in intel-
ligent design or the rightness of our drug laws.
This doesn’t mean that all beliefs are created equal. Just as we strive to improve our beliefs to 
better realize our desires, so we are allowed to point out to others that their beliefs may not be op-
timal for them. And while we normally think of beliefs as instrumental to desires, the process of ar-
gument can change desires as well. Humans differ, but usually by not that much, so there’s always 
the chance to convince others, or to have them convince us (we often refer to the latter phenome-
non as “learning”). You don’t have to win the argument to come out ahead. Arguments over beliefs 
and desires should be viewed less as contests than as mutual help, a sort of intellectual grooming in 
which we try to pick out the bugs and parasites from each other’s intellectual coats.
11. But what do we do about the crazies?
An anonymous reviewer for this journal remarked that my “benign relativism” (the reviewer’s term) 
might be OK where the different models aren’t all that different, but won’t work where the models 
diverge more radically—for example, fundamentalists as opposed to evolutionary biologists, or 
Quakers as opposed to the Islamic State. As to the latter opposition, “embracing relativism at this 
point is deadly” wrote the reviewer.
Yes, there are people whose beliefs will not yield to argument or experience, and some of these 
people may be determined to make our lives miserable. Their models may (temporarily) work for 
them, but the incompatibility between their models and ours means that we can’t live together. 
Relativists tend to be tolerant of diverse viewpoints (and people with a tolerance for diversity tend to 
be attracted to social constructivism), but nothing about relativism bars us from taking protective 
measures, from quarantines to drone strikes, against those who intend us harm.
For a relativist, the flaw in antisocial models is not that they do not “correspond to reality,” but 
that the models can’t take their believers where they want to go. In the late 1930s, lots of Germans 
accepted the Nazi picture of the world, but by 1946, confronted by catastrophic experience, almost 
all Germans had abandoned those views. They’d had a learning experience. The jihadi picture of the 
world is probably headed for a similar bad end, for much the same reason: If you make war on eve-
ryone, don’t be surprised if they make war on you.
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But Nazis and jihadis are extreme outliers. For the most part, our society can tolerate radically dif-
ferent models of the world: Our evolutionary biologists, for example, are generally not troubled by 
our fundamentalists, or vice versa. For both groups, their views on Darwin don’t have much effect on 
their interactions in day-to-day life; where they do, we’ve agreed to settle the disputes through a 
political process that emphasizes compromise. We can get along, most of us. Indeed, we have to get 
along if we want a society that will allow human flourishing, however variously that goal may be 
defined.
12. Sitting down with the Lakotas
Which brings us back at last to Sebastian LeBeau’s assertion that the Lakota are the descendants of 
the Buffalo people, who came from inside the earth after supernatural spirits prepared this world for 
humankind to live here.
While views like this tend to make most readers of this journal splutter, our sense of the outra-
geousness of LeBeau’s account is not an argument, let alone an argument likely to convince a 
Lakota. If we’re talking about 1491-vintage Lakotas, the LeBeau account may have been the most 
useful likely to be generated in 1491 Lakotaland, given the limited resources of Lakota society and 
its isolation from 1491-vintage Western science.
But for modern Lakotas, who watch TV, drive pickup trucks, and probably don’t want to live like 
pre-Columbian Lakotas, Mr. LeBeau’s anti-scientific model is likely to be counter-productive. It’s not 
that the archeological model conforms to the world and the LeBeau model does not; it’s that the 
archeological model conforms to the world in a way that is likely to prove fruitful for twenty-first-
century Lakotas, while the LeBeau model, whatever its virtues for fifteenth-century Lakotas, is likely 
to be suboptimal for today’s Lakotas. The Lakota world has opened up in a way that offers more 
useful models.
In particular, modern Lakotas have the opportunity to become part of a vastly wider belief system, 
albeit one that rejects much of the Lakotas’ traditional beliefs. The wider belief systems that charac-
terize larger societies can offer the Lakotas much that they want—those TV sets and pickup trucks—
but it’s hard to enter those systems and retain the traditional beliefs for very long.
So the “social constructivist” view might be restated as “for different people in different situations, 
different models may be most successful in helping them achieve their goals.” But if we accept this 
formulation—and I do—it does not follow that anything goes: The twenty-first century is not the 
fifteenth century, the new belief systems now available to the Lakotas may serve them much better 
than their traditional systems, and it is not cultural imperialism for us to point this out. Common 
sense, not to mention good manners, obviously require that such criticism be advanced with some 
delicacy, but—pace the more radical forms of social constructivism—to refrain from such criticism 
does the Lakota no kindness.
There’s nothing for it: We shall have to engage with the Lakotas. They can explain the virtues of 
their beliefs, and we can explain why they should get their flu shots. Over time, I think they’ll come 
around. (Though there may be a particular problem convincing a tribal official such as Mr. LeBeau: “It 
is difficult to get a man to understand something, when his salary depends upon his not understand-
ing it!” (Sinclair, 1935/1994, p. 109)).
Funding
The author received no direct funding for this research.
Author details
Howard Darmstadter1
E-mail: hdarmstadter@gmail.com
ORCID ID: http://orcid.org/0000-0003-3746-3458
1  1159 Rock Rimmon Road, Stamford, CT 06903-1210, USA.
Citation information
Cite this article as: Relativism defended, Howard 
Darmstadter, Cogent Arts & Humanities (2016), 3: 
1166685.
Notes
1. In his 29 December 1976 Presidential Address to the 
Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Associa-
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tion, Hilary Putnam announced his own rejection of the 
correspondence theory (Putnam, 1977).
2. This is close to Nelson Goodman’s view. “The movement 
[of philosophy] is from unique truth and a world fixed 
and found to a diversity of right and even conflicting 
versions or worlds in the making.” (Goodman, 1978,  
p. x). My discussion of isomorphism also owes much to 
Goodman (1951, ch. 1).
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